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(Crim. Ro. 4G72. In Bank. Dec. 1, 1944.)

TIlE PEOPLE, ~pondcnt, Y. l\IAE A. WILSO:N",
Appellant.

\

\

[lJ Abortion - Evidence - Corrobwration.-In II. prosecution for
abortion, the victim's testimony rcquires corroboration under
Pen. Codc, § 1108.
[2J ld.-Evidence-Corroboration-Husband's Testimony.-In a
prosecution for abortion, the testimony of the victim's husband requires corroboration if hC' was an accomplice of defendant. (Pen. Code, ~ l1lJ.)
[3] ld. - Evidence-Corrobol'ation-Husband as Accomplice.-In
a prosecution for abortion, the mere fact that the victim's
husband accompanied his wife to dE'fendant's office did not
make him an accomplice requiring {'orroborntion of his testimony.
[4J ld. - Evidence-:..Corroboration"':"'Husband as Accomplice.-In
a prosecution for abortion, thE' victim's hushand was an accomplicE' within Pen. Code. ~ l1ll. where he provided the fE'e
for the abortion, assurC'd defenoant that thE' money was
ready and inquired of thE' lattE'r how long- h(' would havE' to
wait; where he statE'd that he knew that the purpose of his
wifc's appointment with defendant "'as an abortion; and "'here,
on b('inQ' asked whC'th('r hE' took his wife to defendant's office
for thAt purpOSE'. h(' Ans"'erE'o thAt "that was more or less up
to her." Such eyidenc(' show('d flInt he played an active part
in the transaction and WAS therefore subject to prosecntion
for th(' offensE' with ,~hil'h d('fenilant WA~ charged.
[5] ld.-Evidence-Corroboration.-In a prosecution for abortion,
the victim anil h('r hmb:mil {'01110 corroborate ('nl'h other's
testimon.\' .
[6] ld.-Evidence-Corroboration-Woman Submitting to Abortion as Accomplice.-A marricd woman submitting to an abortion, bdng sllbjc(>t to pro~eclltion under Pen. Code, § 275, and
not undE'r ~ 274. is not an accomplice of the person performinf:t
the operation or of the hl1~bano. who are subject to prosecution
nndE'r ~ 274.

llJ See 1 Cal.Jur. 111; 1 Am.Jur. 151.
McK. Dig. References: [1-7,10,11] Ahortion, § 6; (8] Criminal
Law. § 577(2); [9] Criminal Law, §~ 577, 577(6); [12, 15] Criminal Law, § 555; [13, 14) Criminal Law. § 561(1); [161 Criminal
Law, §§ 284, 1382(29); [17] Criminal Law, § 1432; [18J Witnesses, § 120(2); (19) Criminal Law, '1349(3).
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[7a, 7b] Id. - Evidence - Corroboration. - In a prosecution for
abortion, the victim's tC'stimoll,v Ivlc(luatC'lv corrohoratet] that
of her husband, and his festimony sufficiently corroborated
hers, where shl' testifiC'tl thnt. dl?fentlant performed an illegal
operat.ion on hC'r, alld gnve detail~ a:s to making an appointment for the opC'ratioll, ascertaining- t.'iH' f('e. going to defendant's office with hl'r hushand. their intervicw with d<>fendant
assuring the latter that they had the money, thl' husband
being told t.o wait outside the office, and feeling experienced
during the operation, and her physical condition both before
and after the operation; and where the husband's testimony
was substantially the same with respect to the interview with
defendant and to his wife's health.
[8] Criminal Law-Accomplice Testimony-CorroboratioD-Requisites.-Ro long as evidence to corroborate the testimony of an
8C'complice creates more than a suspicion of guilt, it is sufficient even thoug-h it be slight and, when standing by itself.
entitl<>d to hnt littll' consid<>ration.
[9] Id.-Accomplice Testimony-Corroboration-Requisiies.-In a
criminal prosecution. the evidence necessary to corroborate
the testimony of an accomplice may consist of defendant's
testimony and inferences therefrom, as well as·inferences from
the circumstances surrounding the criminal transaction; it
need not establish the precise facts testified to by the witness
whose t('stimony it supports.
[10] Abortion-Evidence-Su1Ii.ciency.-In a prosecution for abol-tion, inferences connecting defendant with the abortion which,
according to the expert opinion of a physician; had occurred,
conld justifiedly be drawn from def!:!ndant's failure to k('l'p
writtpn records.
[11] Id.-Evidence-Corroboration.-In a prosecution for abortion,
the victim's testimony as to the use of instruments in the
operation does not need spe!'ial corroboration.
[12] Criminal Law-Evidence-Expert Testimony-Physical Condition.-A physician may take into consideration a patient's
declarations as to her condition, if they are nt'cessary to enabl!'
him in connection with his own ohservations to form an opinion as to the patient's past or present physical or mental COil·
dition; and in a prost'l!ution for abortion. the fact that 1\
physician's opinion as to absence of necessity for an abortion
is partly based on the case history obtained from the victim
does not make such opinion inadmissible.
[18] Id.-Evidence-Expert Testimony-Hypothetical Questions.
-In obta.ining opinion evidence from an expert. the trial court

[13] See 8 OaLJur. 162; 20 Am.Jur. 662.
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should prevent the usc of misleaoing- or unfair hypothetical
questions, permitting only questions that sufficiently specify
the assumptions on which they arc based and contain only
such assumptions as do no~('ontn!('lid t.h(> wei!!'ht of the evidence in th(> caRe.
[14] Id.--Evidence--Expert Testimony-Hypothetical Questions.
-While each hypothesis containen in a question ashd an expert witness should have some evident?e to support it. it is not
necessary that the question include a statement of all the
evidence in the case. The statement may assume facts within
the limits of the evidence. not unfairly assembled, on which
the expert's opinion is required, and considerahle latitude
must be allowed in the choice of facts as to the basis on which
to frame a hypothetical question.
[15] Id.-Evidence--Expert Testimony-Ma.tters Directly in Issue.
-There is no hard and fast rule that an expert cannot be
asked a question that coincides with the ultimate issue in the
case; and in a prosecution for abortion, questions asked a
physician as to whether in his opinion the abortion was spontaneous or induced, or whether it was performed in order to
preserve the victim's life. may be proper where there is no
other practicable way of framin/! the questions if the witness'
expert knowledge is to be obtainn.
[16] Id.-Tria.I-ltebuttal Testimony: Appeal-Ha.nnless and Reversible Error-Evidence of Other Oft'enses.-In a prosecution
for abortion, testimony concerning defendant's statement to
an arresting officer that c('rtain sllrgical instruments had never
been returned to her following their seizure at the time of a
prior arrest, was admissible. not for the purpose of proving
defendant's prior arrest. bnt to rehut the inferenc(' that no
instruments were used. which could be drawn from the fact
that the arresting offiC'ers were unable to find such instruments
in defendant's office. The importance of this evidence in the
proof of the People's case outweighed any prejudiee to defendant from th(' reference to her former arrest.
[17] Id.-Instructions-Limiting Evidence.-In a prosecution for
abortion. where te!ltimonv concern in!!' defendant's statement
to an arresting officer th'at certain surgical instruments had
never been returned to her followin/! a prior arrest was admitted for the purpose of rebutting an inference that no instruments were used, defendant was entitled to have the jury
instructed as to the limited purpose for which the evidence
was admittl'd.
[18]. Witnesses - Cross-exa.mination - Defendants in Criminal
Cases.-In a prosecution for abortion, where defendant testided on direct examination as to what hapJ)elled when the
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victim was in defendant's oflfc'e lind what fce was charged for
the alleged E'xllmination, it wa!l 'Proper to cross-examine defendant with respert to a telephone conversation preceding
thE' appointment and other facts and ci,"cumstances surround-.
ing the transaction, including 8 failure to enter the ftlleged
fee' in a record as is cllstomary.
[19J Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless a.nd Reversible Error-Indictment and Information. - In a criminal prosecution, no
prejudicial error could result from denial of a motion to set
aside the information because there was no evidence at the
preliminary hearing of reasonable or probable cause. as required by Pen. Code. § 995. where the proof submitted at the
trial was sufficient, not only to show reasonable and probable
cause. but to support the verdict.

)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County and from an order denying a new ~rial.
Harold B. Landreth, Judge. Afiirmed.
Prosecution for abortion. Judgment of conviction affirmed.
Morris Lavine for Appellant.
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, Frank Richards and
T. G. Negrich, Deputies Attorney General, Fred N. Howser,
District Attorney, and Jere J. Sullivan, Deputy District Attorney, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant appealR from a judgment eonvicting her of· the crime of abortion and from an order denying her motion for a new trial. The prol'lecuting witness, Mrs.
Marcella Anderson. gave the followiIig te!'ltimony: On August
2.1943. defendant performed an illegal operation on her. She
made the appointment fot' the operation with defendant over
the telephone. and defendant Itfolked her how many periods
she had missed and !'Itated that the fee would be $100. She
went to defendant'!'! office with her hURband. Defendant inquired whether they had the money and received an affirmative answer. She then told the hU!!band to wait outside the
office because her patient.'! were women. After her hURband
left. Mrs. Anderson paid the defendant $100 and asked defendant what method she used. Defendant replied that it
was a curettement. During the operation. which took about
S5 minutes, the witness lay on a table while defendant worked

)

)
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between her legs, an~she could not ::lee whether defendant
used an instrument. She felt something. inserted into her
vagina, however, and also felt a painful scraping and pulling
inside her body. She heard metallic sounds, caused by the
different thing!-; that she had lelt inside her body. as they
were laid on the table and picked up again. She felt well
when sjle went to defendant but very weak when she met her
husband in the building after leaving defendant's office. When
she reached home she went to bed with a fever and in great
pain. During the second night following the operation she
was brought to a hospital. Her Busband's testimony was substantially the same with respect to the interview with defendant before he left defendant's office to wait for his wife
and with respect to his wife's health before and after her stay
in defendant's office. He te..<;tified that he reassured defendant
that the money was at hand when she inquired about the
money and that he asked defendant how long it would take
and was advised by her that she could not tell; that it might
be thirty minutes or three hours. His testimony differed from
that of his wife as to the date she entered the hospital. He
•. +nt("l thnt it \Val" the night of August 7th to August 8th.
Dr. Malone, the physician who attended Mrs. Anderson durldg lie,' twelve days in the hospital, testified that he examined
her after her arrival in the hospital on the morning of August 4th, that she was running a temperature, that her uterus
was enlarged, that he found a body remaining therein, and
that the cervix was effaced. He stated that this effacement
indicated that the patient was about to lose the pregnancy
conception in her uterus. He further testified that it was his
opinion, based on his observations and the case history obtained from Mrs. Anderson when she was under his care that
an abortion was induced by outside interference while she
was in a stage of pregnancy of about two and a half or three
months, and that the abortion was inevitable. Defendant.
testifying in her own behalf. denied that she performed an
abortion, claiming that she merely examined Mrs. Anderson
but could not complete the examination and was therefore
unable to discern whether Mrs. Anderson was pregnant. She
testified that Rhe charged $10 for the examination but that
she did not keep written records, and she was unable to produce a written record of the fee.
Defendant contends that there was not sufficient evidence
that an abortion was committed or that it was performed by

. ..
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thc use of all instrument. If the verdict can legally be based
on the testimony of the three .witnesses, it is clearly supported
by the evidence. Defendant~ontcnds, however, that the testimony of Mrs. Anderson and her husband was not sufficiently
corroborated and that part of Dr. Malone's testimony was
'
inadmissible.
[1] Mrs. Anderson~ testimony required corroboration
under section 1108 of the Penal Code, which provides that the
testimony of the woman upon whom an abortion has been performed must be corroborated by other evidence. [2] Mr.
Anderson's testimony required corroboration if he was an
accomplice of defendant. (Pen. Code, § 1111.) [3] The mere
fact that he accompanied his wife to defendant's office does
not make him an accomplice. (People v. Balkwell, 143 Cal.
259,261 [76 P. 1017]; People v. Brewer, 19 Cal.App. 742, 746
[127 P. 808]; People v. Seiffert, 81 Cal. App. 195, 198 [253 P.
189].) [4] Mr. Anderson, however, also provided the $100
fee for the abortion and had a conversation with defendant
in which he assured her that the money was ready -and inquired of her how long he would have to wait, thus showing
his intention to facilitate the commission of the crime by being
at hand to take his wife home. He stated that he knew the
purpose of his wife's appointment with defendant was an
abortion. When he was asked whether he took his wife to
defendant's office for the purpose of an abortion he answered
that "that was more or less up to her." The evidence shows
that he played an active part in the transaction and was therefore subject to prosecution for the offense with which defendant was charged (Pen. Code. § 31; People v. Shaw, 17
Ca1.2d 778.799 [112 P.2d 241]), and was therefore an accom"
plice within the definition of section 1111 of the Penal Code.
(People v. Clapp, 24 Ca1.2d 835, 838 (151 P.2d 237].)
[5] Mr. and Mrs. Anderson could corroborate each other's
testimony. [6] Mrs. Anderson. as the woman on whom the
crime of abortion was committed was subject to prosecution,
not under section 274 of the Penal Code prescribing punishment for abortion, but only under section 275 of the Penal
Code, and was therefore not an accomplice of defendant or
the husband who were subject to prosecution under section
274. (People v. Clapp, supra.) [7a] The wife's testimony
I\dequately corroborated that of her husband. His testimony
was also ~llfficient to corroborate hers even if it be assumed
that the corroborating evidence required by section 1108 must,

)
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like that required by llection,l1l1 with re:spect to accomplices,
tend to connect the defendant with the offense. [8] So long

as corroborating ev~encc creates more than a suspicion of
guilt, it is sufficient even though it "be slight and, when standing by itself, entitled to but little consideration." (People v.
Negm, 208 ·Cal. 64, 69 [280 ~. 354]; People v. Dorrance, 65
Cal.App.2d 125, 130 [150 P.2d 10] j People v. Shaw, supra, at
p. 802.) [9] It may consist of testimony of the defendant and
inferences therefrom as well as inferences from the circumstances surrounding the criminal transaction (People v. Negra,
supra; People v. (la.rne1·, 60 Cal.App.2d 63 [140 P.2d 146];
People v. .Dorrance, supra; Commonwealth v. Follansbee, 155
Mass. 274' [29 N.E. 471]; Commonwealth v. Fenno, 134 Mass.
217 j see 1 C.J .S: 338), and it need not establish the precise
facts testified to by the witness whose testimony it supports.
(People v. Negra, supra; People v. Lee, 81 Ca1.App. 49, 53 [252
P. 763); People v. Dorrance, supra.) [7b] Mr. Anderson's
conversation with defendant, and the latter's inquiry about the
money and her statement that he might have to wait thirty
minutes or three hours indicate something more serious than
a routine examination. His observation that his wife was well
when she entered defendant's office but ill when she left lends
support to the inference that defendant brought about this
change in Mrs. Anderson's condition. [10] Further infer·
ences connecting defendant with the abortion, which, according to the expert opinion of Dr. Malone, had Occurred, could
justifiably be drawn from defendant's failure to keep written
records. [11] Mrs. Anderson's testimony as to the use of
instruments does not need special corroboration. (People v.
SlItitherman, 58 Cal.App.2d 121, 123 [135 P.2d 674]; People
v. Lorraine, 28 CaLApp.2d 50, 53 [81 P.2d 1004]; People v.
Thompson, 16 Cal.App. 748, 750 [117 P. 1033].)
Defendant contends that the following opinion evidence was
improperly elicited from Dr. Malone: "Q. From your examination of this case, this patient, Mrs. Anderson, and from the
ease history that you took. did you form an opinion as to
whether her abortion was spontaneous or induced' A. It was
my opinion that the abortion was induced...• Q. Doctor,
assuming for, the purpose of this case that an abortion is performed on Mrs. Anderson on August 2nd, 1943, and that you
examined her within a few days after it happened, on August
4th, 1943, and assuming further, Doctor, that an abortion had

)
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beelJ performed on Mrs. Anderson for the purpose of preserving her life, would the c~ditjons requiring that Rbortion be
observable on August 4th T ••• A. At the time I examined
the patient. Mrs. All!leJ'soll. I found 110 evidencc that a thera
peutir abortion was necessary. Q. ... .. Then, in your opiniOJI.
Doc·tor, you would say that from your examination of Mrs
AnucT'son, the abortion was not pcrformed in order to pre·
serve her life, is that correct T A. That is correct." Defendant
attacks the admission of this testimony on the grounds that
the questions called for answers based in part on the case
history, namely, declarations of the patient, rather than on
the observations of the physician, that they allowed the expert
to make a determination that it was the sole province of the
jury to make. and that the facts assumed were not proved.
[12] The fact that Dr. Malone's opinion was partly based
on the case history obtained from Mrs. Anderson does not make
it inadmissible. It is settled tliat a physician may take into
consideration a patient's declarations as to his conditi()n, if
t.hey are necessary to enable him in connection with his own
observations to form an opinion as to the patient's past or
present ph~Tsical or mental condition. (People v. Shattuck,
109 Cal. 673, 678 f42 P. 315]: Groat v. Walkup Drayage etc.
('0., 14 Cal.App.2d 350. ::J57 f58 P.2d 200]: Wt770ughby v.
Zylstra, 5 Cal.App.2d 297. 300 [42 P.2d 685J: Tierney v.
Charles Nelson Co., 19 Cal.App.2d 34. 37 [64 P.2d 1150]; see
6 Wigmore. Evidence (3d ed.) § 1722(1'): 67 A.TJ.R. ]0: 80
A.L.R. 1527: 130 A.L.R. 977.)
The method of obtaining opinion evidence from an expert
h;v hypothetical questions is· unsatisfactory (see 2 Wigmore,
Evidence (3d ed.) § 686; Hulbert, Psychiatric Testimony in
Probate Proceedings, 2 Law and Contemporary Problems, 548,
554). but it is at present the least objectionable known to the
law. (People v. Le Doux, 155 Cal. 535, 554 [102 P. 517].)
[13] The trial court, however, should prevent the use of misleading or unfair hypothetical questions, permitting only questions that sufficiently specify the assumptions on which they
are based and contain only BUch assumptions as do not contradict the weight of the evidence in the case. (Christiansen v.
Hollings, 44 Cal.App.2d 332, 348 [112 P.2d 723]; Weaver v.
Shell Co., 34 Cal.App.2d 713 [94 P.2d 364J ; Bickford v. Lawson, 27 Ca1.App.2d 416. 426 [81 P.2d 2161; Grat'Cs v. Union
Oil Co., 36 Cal.App. 766, 770 [173 P. 618]; Estate of Gould,
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[14] While each hypothesis containcd in the (/fiestiol1 should have some evidence to
sUPI>Ol't "it, it is not necessary tl18t the question include a
statement of all the evidence in the case. The statement
may assume facts within the 'limits of the evidence. not
nnfairly as;;embleu. UPOIl which the opinion of the expert is
requircd. and considerablelatitnde mm;t be allowed ill tl)('
choice of facts as to the basil' upon which to frame a hypo·
thetical (lUestion. (Treadwell v. Nickel, 194 Cal. 24~~, 267 [22H
P. 25]; Forbis v. Holzman, 5 Ca1.2d 407, 410 155 P.2(1 20]];
Mil'ich v. Bolsinger, 53 Cal.App.2d 103, 117 [127 P.2d 6301;
Chl-istiansen v Hollings, supra.) All facts assumed in pl·OSC·
cuting counsel's questions in the present case were sustaine(l
by the evidence exeept the assumed fact that the abortion was
performed for the preservation of Mrs. Anderson's life. This
fact, however, if true. would have been favorable to defendant,
[15] There is no hard and fast rule that the expert cannot
be asked a question that coincides with the ultimate issue in
the case "We think the true rule is that admissibility depends on the nature of the issue and the circumstances of the
case, there being a large element of judicial discretion involved. . .. Oftentimes an opinion may be received on 8
simple ultimate issue, even when it is the sole one, as for
example where the issue is the value of an article, or the
sanity of a person; because it cannot be further simplified
and cannot be fully tried without hearing opinions from those
in better position to form them than the jury can be placen
in." (Hamt1ton v. United States, 73 F.2d 357, 358-9; Rackoff
v. United States, 78 F.2d 671, 673; see, also, Nolan v. Nolan,
155 Cal. 476, 480 [101 P. 520, 132 Am.St.Rep. 99,17 Ann.Cas.
1066]; Giraudi v. Electric Imp. Co., 107 Cal. 120, 127 [40 P.
108,48 Am.St.Rep. 114, 28 L.R.A. 596]; Sim v. Weeks, 7 Cal.
App.2d 28, 39 [45 P.2d 350]; Huru:it v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 45 Cal.App.2d 74, 82 [113 P.2d 691]; 78 AJ.J.R. 755;
4 Wigmore Evjdence (3d ed.) § 1921; 7 N.C.L.Rev. 320.) In
the present
there was no other practicable. way of
framing the questions if they were to serve the purpose of
obtaining the benefit of the witness's expert knowledge as to
matters on which enlightenment of the jury by the expert waf!
proper. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1870(9); Moore v. Norwood, 41
Cal.App.2d 359, 366 [106 P.2d 939] ; El1{1e1kinn v. Car7son, 13
. Ca1.2d 216, 221 [88 P.2d 695] ; Patterson v. Marcus, 203 Cal.

case
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550, 553 [265 lY'222]; Perkins v. Trueblood, 180 Cal. 437,
443 l181 P. G-!2J.)
[16] Defendant contenu;; that prejudicial error was committeu uy the trial comt 'in denying defendant's motion to
strike testimony of Maynard Young, an investigator for the
Btate Medical Board, on the ground that evidence of another
crime was inadmissible. The witness was asked by counsel for
the People whether he had a conversation with defendant
when he arrested her in bel' office. He testified that while
arresting her he asked defendant where the instruments were
that she used in cur-ettements, and that she replied that those
instruments had never been returned to her after they had
been taken from her at the time of a previous arrest. Defendant's statement to the arresting officer, however, was admissible, not for the purpose of proving a former arrest of
defendant, but to rebut the inference that no instruments
were used, which could be drawn from the fact that the arresting officers at the time of the arrest were unable to find
in defendant's office instruments that are regularly used for
abortions of the type in question. The jury could infer from
the fact that such instruments had been taken from defendant
at a previous arrest that she would be careful not to keep new
instruments in her office, or tbat sbe might have performed
the abortion with instruments other than those regularly used.
The latter inference finds support in defendant's inability to
complete the abortion. The importance of this evidence in the
proof of the People's case outweighed any prejudice to the
defendant from the reference to her former arrest. (Adkins
v. Brett, 184 Cal. 252, 258 [193 P. 251].) [17] Defendant
was entitled, however, to have the jury instructed as to the
limited purpose for which the evidence was admitted (Adkins
v. Brett, supra, at p. 259), but she does not contend that she
requested such an instruction and that it was denied.
[18] Defendant contends that her constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination was violated on the ground that the
questions admitted on her cross-examination with respect to
the telephone conversation preceding the appointment, the
keeping of records by defendant, and her questioning !vII's.
Anderson about the missing of periods, were outside the scope
of allowable cross-examination. A defendant may be crossexamined under section 1323 of the Penal Code "as to all
matters about which he was examined in chief." Here, defendant was examined by her counsel as to what happened

Dec. 1944]

PEOPLE V. WILSON

3j1

[25 C.Zd 341; 153 P.2d 720)

when Mrs. Anderson was in defendant's office and what fee
defendant charged .-ror tlle alleged examination. This direct
examination opened the door to inquiry as to preparatory
steps concel'ning the nppointment and other facts and circumstances surrounding the trammction, including the failure to
enter the alleged fee in a record as is customary. (Ashley v.
Rivera, 220 Cal. 75, 79 [29 P.2d 199]; People v. Kynette, 15
Ca1.2d 731,753 [104 P.2d 794]; People v. Smith, 43 Cal.App.
2d 110, 116 [110 P.2d 472].)'
[19] Defendant contendH that there was no evidence at the
preliminary hearing of reasonable or probable cause, as required by section 995 of the Penal Code, and that therefore
her motion to set aside the information was improperly denied. Defendant has failed to point out in what respect the
proof at that time was insuffiGient to show reasonable or probable cause. (See People v. Novell, 54 Cal.App.2d 621, 623 [129
P.2d 453].) If error was committed, it was not prejudicial,
for the proof submitted at the trial was sufficient, not only to
show reasonable and probable cause, but to support the verdict.
The judgment and order are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Edmonds, J.,
concurred.

)

SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. By the testimony of Mrs. Anderson she was not merely an innocent victim upon whom an
abortion was attempted without her knowledge or consent;
she was on the contrary an active participant, wilfully aiding
and nbetting in the project. Therefore she was guilty as a
principal and as an accomplice of the defendant in violating
section 274 of the Penal Code, if in fact any crime was proved.
and not section 275. The latter section (275) is obviously
designed primarily, if not exclusively. to cover situations not
covered by the former. The latter section is intended to punish
hvo things: (1) the solicitation and taking of drugs by a
woman, on her own account and without the necessity for
participatjon by any other person. "with intent thereby to
procure a miscarriage"; (2) the passive submission, with like
intent, to an operation. It does not cover active participation
in the yiolation of section 274. That section (274). coupled
with the provisions of sections 31 and 971 of the same code.
covers the arth'ities of hoth Mr. Imd Mrs. Anderson and the
defendant. They are all accomplices and all principals in a
~~
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The experience and wisdom of mankind, particularly of
those dealing with judicial trials, accumulated throu~h many
generations, have brought the conclusion that "evidence of
an accomplice, comfng from a tainted source, the witness
being, first, an infamous man, from his own ('onfession of
guilt, and, second, a man usually testifying in the hope of
favor or the expectatioll of immunity, was not entitled to the
same consideration as the evidence of a clean man." (People
v. Coffey (1911),161 Cal. 433, 438 (119 P. 901, 39 L.R.A.N.S.
704).) In recognition of this conclusion the Legislature of
California has laid down the rule that" A conviction cannot
be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be
corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect
the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the
corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof." (Pen. Code,
§ 1111.)
The majority opinion here, as in People v. Clapp (1944),24
Cal.2d 835 [151 P.2d 237], ascribes to section 275 a potency
which I do not believe is justified by that section's language
or purpose Such construction appears to me to subvert the
clear meaning of sections 274. 31 and 971 of the Penal Code,
and to accomplish the circumvention of the salutary provisions
of section 1111. Such strained constructions benefit neither
law nor justice. The Legislature gave further evidence of its
concern that there be no convictions in abortion cases upon
tainted evidence alone-which may be wholly false and given
for ulterior purposes-by the enactment of section n08 of the
Penal Code. If that section and section 1111 were given effect
in this case the judgment could not stand. Regardless of our
feeling as to the likelihood of guilt of the defendant in this
or any other particular case it is our duty to scrupulously
uphold the law as enacted by the State.
For the reasons above stated and for the additional considerations depicted in my dissenting opinion in People v.
Clapp (1944), supra, 24 C8.1.2d 840, the judgment should be
reversed.
Carter, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December
28, 1944. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a rehearing.

